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ญี่ปุ่นบุกหาดหาดสมิหลา สงขลา

เริ่มโดย คนแต่แรกกก442, 11:01 น. 19 ธ.ค 55

คนเขารูปช้าง

Geography

The province of Songkhla has an approximate area of 7150 square kilometres, and is located roughly 1276 kilometres away from Bangkok. Neighbouring provinces are (from east clockwise) Satun, Phattalung, Nakhorn Sri Thammarat, Pattani and Yala. To the south the province borders Malaya.


Preliminaries

By mid-1941, when the possibility of war in Asia was looming ever closer, Songkhla quickly bore the attention of military planners in Tokyo, Singapore, and Bangkok. The war planners in Fort Canning had prepared a contingency plan in the event of a Japanese invasion of Malaya. Codenamed "Matador", the plan called for a push by British and Indian units into Thailand, towards the Isthmus of Kra, in order to deny the use of the vital Songkhla and Patani airfields to the Japanese.

คนเขารูปช้าง

The Governor of Songkhla with the visiting Colonel Luang Kriengsakphichit pose along with officers of the 5th Infantry Regiment, 1939.


Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, Commander-in-Chief Far East, cabled London on August 6 and 7 explaining to the Chiefs of Staff the strategic importance of Songkhla. The fact that Songkhla was the only port of any real consequence on the east coast of the Kra Isthmus; that the existence of landing places, ports, landing grounds for bombers, and road and rail connections to both the east and west coasts of Malaya, gave ample support to the theory that a Japanese seizure of the Thai port was more than a merely plausible scenario.

คนเขารูปช้าง

A view of Songkhla, circa 1938. 


Brooke-Popham further explained that were the Japanese to gain control of the Hat Yai railway junction, then they "would be able to concentrate quickly towards the east or west of the frontier, while the British would not be able to do so because of the central range in north Malaya and the absence of direct road and rail connections between east and west. The Japanese would be adequately supplied in any operations south of Songkhla through the port and railway system. However, if they were forced to fight north of Songkhla, the Japanese line of communication would be dependent on a single railway line and inferior roads." Thus the C-in-C Far East concluded that the establishment of a forward defence on the Kra Isthmus was vitally necessary to the defence of Malaya.

Songkhla had seen its share of espionage activities prior to December 8, 1941. Japanese merchants were to be found everywhere, photographing everything in sight; English "tourists" also travelled extensively through the various towns. But unlike their Asian counterparts, the thirty or so British officers sent into Thailand "were almost all amateurs who treated the job as an escapade, an exciting way of getting away from the battalion for a while". The men were issued passports claiming them variously as journalists, lawyers, accountants, a few as comedians, and one as a circus acrobat. There were many a times when British and Japanese stayed in the same hotels, both parties eyeing each other suspiciously within the lobbies.



คนเขารูปช้าง

(ขอแทรกครับ บรรทัดแรกภาษาอังกฤษคือคำบรยายใต้ภาพ ในโพสต์อันที่ผ่านๆมาแล้วครับ)

Songkhla's civil servants pose in front of the Governor's Residency, 1939.


Earlier in the spring of that year, twenty-nine year-old Captain Shigeharu Asaeda had travelled under the guise of an agricultural engineer throughout southern Thailand and Malaya, observing roads and photographing shorelines in his hunt for prospective landing grounds. After having completed a reconnaissance tour of Burma, Asaeda reported back to Saigon.

He returned on October 22 in an unmarked, unarmed twin-engine Mitsubishi Ki-46 piloted by Captain Ikeda of the 18, Independent Chutai. Seated on the plane was Asaeda's superior, the notorious intelligence officer cum tactician Colonel Masanobu Tsuji, who had decided to embark on an espionage mission of his own. They flew over Songkhla and Patani, surveying the surrounding areas. Despite the rain storm, the plane headed southwards and were soon above the aerodromes at Alor Star and Khota Bahru. Having thoroughly examined the ground below, the three returned to army headquarters at Saigon.

The Engagement

On the night of December 7, 1941, at approximately 23:40, a police patrol noticed ships of indiscernible identities moored off the coasts of the province.

คนเขารูปช้าง

(ขอแทรกครับ บรรทัดแรกภาษาอังกฤษคือคำบรยายใต้ภาพ ในโพสต์อันที่ผ่านๆมาแล้วครับ)

The Japanese Invasion of Songkhla


At around the same time that the Police Chief was informed of this most unusual sight, Songkhla's Governor, Luang Angkhananurak, ensconced in the province's official seaside country clubhouse, also caught sight of the ships. He, however, did not make much of them as the Royal Thai Navy were supposed to be conducting manoeuvres at the time. It was only when it was pointed out that the ships had their lights suspiciously turned off that the Governor summoned in Lieutenant Commander Noparat Smitanon, the Naval Officer in Charge, Songkha. When it was confirmed that the ships did not belong to the Royal Thai Navy - who had already returned to Bangkok earlier that evening - Luang Angkhananurak became alarmed, albeit belatedly, and immediately telephoned local police and army units to warn them of the impending invasion.

คนเขารูปช้าง

(ขอแทรกครับ บรรทัดแรกภาษาอังกฤษคือคำบรยายใต้ภาพ ในโพสต์อันที่ผ่านๆมาแล้วครับ)

Songkhla's Government Official's Clubhouse , 1936
 

The ships in question belonged to the Imperial Japanese Navy's Songkhla Invasion Unit (as part of the larger Malaya Invasion Group) under the command of Rear Admiral K. Hiraoka. The unit comprised the transport ships Ryujo Maru, Aobasan Maru, Asakkasan Maru, Atsutayama Maru, Kansai Maru, Kashii Maru, Kyushu Maru, Sado Maru, Sasako Maru, and the Nako Maru - all bearing Lieutenant General Tomoyuki Yamashita's 25th Army. In tow were the destroyers Amagiri, Asagiri, Yugiri, and Murakumo, as well as four minesweepers, three seaplane tenders, one gunboat, and a minelayer.

Of the landing operations, Colonel Tsuji recounted that "our large transport was rolling heavily, and just as the anchor was lowered the northeast wind suddenly freshened. The question was, would it be possible to launch the boats in such heavy seas, and even if it were, could the troops laden with their equipment climb down the rope ladders from the ships'decks and transfer into the boats? The officers and men of our engineer detachments, standing at the rail, watched the seas dashing against the side of the ship and said with scolding voices, 'It's useless, isn't it? What fools to think of disembarkation in such heavy seas!' This was really the sincere opinion of the men responsible for handling the boats. The seas were at least three metres high - possibly higher. In peacetime manouevres men would not have been exposed to the danger of transhipment in such circumstances. It seemed as if the boats would be swamped as they lay alongside.

As if to efface all uncertainty a light signal was displayed at the masthead of the Ryujo Maru. 'Lower the boats', was what it meant. In succession the signal was repeated from the Kashii Maru and the other transports. When the boats were lowered the engineers with the agility of monkeys climbed into them. Soon nearly a hundred motor boats were floating beside the transports, tossing up and down on the waves like the leaves of a tree in the wind. With poles the engineers desperately kept them from bumping the sides of the transports. In the dim moonlight the launching of the boats had somehow proved easier than had been thought possible. Soon, the next signal light appeared. 'Commence transhipment'."

According to the few Thai eyewitness accounts available, approximately twenty Japanese motorboats approached the shore and Japanese infantry were soon disembarking onto the various beaches.

Among the first to land was Tsuji, whose plan to crash through the Malayan frontier called for his men to be dressed up in Thai uniforms, round up dance-hall girls as cover, commandeer a number of buses, and drive merrily down to the border waving Trairongs and Union Jacks, where they would be let through by dazed border guards.

คนเขารูปช้าง

(ขอแทรกครับ บรรทัดแรกภาษาอังกฤษคือคำบรยายใต้ภาพ ในโพสต์อันที่ผ่านๆมาแล้วครับ)

The Japanese Consul.


But Tsuji's dream was not to be true. Major Osone was not on the beach waiting for the invaders, and Tsuji had to go into Songkhla town where he pounded on the Japanese consulate's gate, waking up the portly consul, who drowsily greeted him with the words, "Ah, the Japanese army."

A furious Tsuji forced the consul to drive him to the town's police station. When they neared the building, a shot took out one of the car's headlights. "Don't shoot!" the interpreter whom the Colonel had brought along called out. "This is the Japanese Army! Join us and attack the British!" The Thai answer was a fusillade of shots aimed at the consul's white suit, which at the time made a most tempting target. Tsuji's master plan had failed, and the Japanese would have to take Songkhla by force.

คนเขารูปช้าง

(ขอแทรกครับ บรรทัดแรกภาษาอังกฤษคือคำบรยายใต้ภาพ ในโพสต์อันที่ผ่านๆมาแล้วครับ)

Japanese troops land. 



A detachment of hastily-assembled policemen were sent to take up positions in the Son Forest, overlooking the road leading towards Songkhla Town. While the majority of the 5th Division, under the command of Lieutenant General Takuro Matsui, secured their beachheads under the bewildered gazes of local fishermen, advance parties set off into the night.

"The first thing they did was climb up telephone poles to cut the wires. I think some local folk shot at them. The Japanese were brave ... one fell but another took his place. They didn't care about been shot," recalled 75 year-old (as of 2005) Saman Mahanpan, a village elder of Kao Seng who was twelve at the time of the invasion.

At 01:00 on December 8, Colonel Luang Praharnkhasukh was abruptly roused by a telephone ring. The call came from Nit Nakhornthap, the provincial judge, who excitedly informed Songkhla's garrison (the 18th Infantry Regiment) commander that warships of unidentified nationality were noted to have been anchored off in nearby waters. Another call, this time from the Governor, told him that the ships were Japanese. Moments later, the colonel was seated in his staff car, headed for the Governor's house. When it became clear that the invaders were making for the town, the three quickly left for the comparative safety of an army camp.

Along the way, Colonel Luang Praharnkhasukh made a quick stop at the 41st Infantry Battalion's camp at Suan Tul, ordered the alarms to be sounded, and whizzed on into downtown Songkhla, where he met a worried Governor and Pwuang Suwannarat, a representative of the Ministry of the Interior.

Major General Dejd Tulawanthana, then a captain commanding 13th Artillery Battalion's 2nd Battery , recounts the wake-up call:

"I awoke to the sounds of a bugle call, its tune signalling that something was amiss. I quickly got myself dressed, grabbed my field glasses and pistol, and had my boots put on by my batman, Private Bua, as if it was just another regular morning. Before I sped away to the barracks on a bicycle, I had told Private Bua that all of my belongings in my compartment were to be given to him should I die.

I duly arrived at my battery's barracks. I took a glimpse at my wristwatch. The time was a few minutes past one in the morning. The men were resigned to waiting for orders from the CO to come. The whole scene was one of extreme calm, as if we were not preparing for war but for a manoeuvre. The men's spirit were high; they were quite eager ."

คนเขารูปช้าง

(ขอแทรกครับ บรรทัดแรกภาษาอังกฤษคือคำบรยายใต้ภาพ ในโพสต์อันที่ผ่านๆมาแล้วครับ)

Captain Dejd Tulawanthana


The first clash between the Thais and Japanese occurred at 01:30 on December 8 at the Son Forest, where the invaders drove off the ill-prepared policemen, many of whom were captured by the khaki-clad infantry.

In the meanwhile, as the Thai troops were getting themselves kitted out, Colonel Luang Praharnkhasukh was busy briefing his officers. They were to conduct the defence of Songkhla according to a plan concocted by Major General Luang Senanarong, 6th Army Monthon's General-Officer-Commanding.

The plan, drawn up on December 6, was outlined as follows:

The 41st Infantry Battalion was to hold the Samrong Canal and take up positions on Mount Rup Chaang overlooking the Songkhla-Hat Yai road.
Detachments of the the 41st Infantry Battalion were to take up positions in the Koh Tham Monastery and to hold the summit of Mount Rup Chaang.
The 13th Artillery Battalion were to have its guns set up on Mount Rup Chaang in order to bombard the stretch of beach between Kao Seng and Smila.
An infantry gun platoon and a machine gun platoon from the 41st Infantry Battalion were to take up positions covering the Ban Samrong-Ban Thungwang Road to the south of the battalion's base camp.
The Japanese advance guard, spearheaded by Colonel Saeki's tanks, sped down the roads towards the rail junction at Hat Yai, only halting momentarily to drop off sections of men to hold the various objectives along the way.

Captain Chot Komlawat, as acting commanding officer of the 41st Infantry Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Sedth Siriwatanakuln was away on sick leave), was ordered to take his men out to occupy positions around Ban Samrong and the nearby Mount Rup Chaang. His men, supported by guns from the 13th Artillery Battalion, would have to halt the invaders there.

It is interesting to note that the tank company stationed with the artillery were not put into action. A probable explanation is that Colonel Luang Praharnkhasukh had declined to use them for fear of the tanks getting bogged down in the rain and mud.

คนเขารูปช้าง

(ขอแทรกครับ บรรทัดแรกภาษาอังกฤษคือคำบรยายใต้ภาพ ในโพสต์อันที่ผ่านๆมาแล้วครับ)

"Dr. Kaise", a Japanese fifth columnist. 


The Japanese swiftly occupied Songkhla's train station and harbour, guided by the town's various Japanese "residents". Among them was "Dr. Kaise", a local dentist who had befriended Captain Dejd, who in reality was an officer in the Imperial Japanese Army holding the rank of major.

While preparations for the main force to move out were still being made, forward parties from the 41st Infantry Battalion skirmished with the Japanese infantrymen who had already occupied Ban Samrong.

The guns of the 13th Artillery Battalion were unlimbered on the slopes of Mount Rup Chaang facing Songkhla, while its 2nd Battery was placed in a nearby palm plantation. Captain Dejd and a signals section climbed up to the top of Mount Rup Chaang, where they set up a forward observation base.

" It took a considerable amount of time before we were fully set up - we had to set up the various observation equipment, and on top of that there was the excruciating task of laying the telephone lines."

They were forced to wait until dawn before they could clearly make out the shapes in the distance. Captain Dejd watched a landing craft approach the 7 kilometre-long beach, had his men work out the appropriate calculations, and ordered the batteries below to prepare to fire. At approximately 04:30, a thunderstorm of shells smashed onto the beach, scattering the invaders.

The Japanese responded with a counter barrage (whether it came from field guns or from the destroyers is not known according to Thai sources) aimed at Mount Rup Chaang. The hill was pounded with a total of eight heavy rounds; the Thai forward observation post did managed to survive unscathed.

At the same time, Thai machine guns opened up on Major Kobayashi's battalion, which had been advancing down the road, forcing the invaders to take cover beside the road. "Considering the position in which the enemy were established, we discovered they were deployed on a wide front and had ten machine-guns and a number of other guns covering the road along which our troops were extended in column of route," penned Colonel Tsuji in his book, Singapore: The Japanese Version. He went on to conclude that the Thais had "calculated this position," and that "we will have to knock them down."

Follow-up units of the 5th Division cleared the roadblock set up by 41st Infantry Battalion's 1st Company and subsequently advanced down the Songkhla-Hat Yai Road .

General Yamashita himself had landed at 05:30, and had temporarily set up headquarters on the outskirts of Songkhla. There, he met Tsuji, who reported the situation. The General placed an immediate order for Thai resistance to be crushed as rapidly as possible. Songhkla town and the airfield was speedily taken, with little resistance offered. By 08:00, Yamashita was comfortably seated in the Governor's residency.

Captain Dejd, seeing that the airfield was in enemy hands, manically cranked his field telephone, only to find the lines dead. A signalman sent down the hill later returned, confirming that the lines had been cut by the previous bombardment. Captain Dejd resorted to using semaphore flags to signal for the guns to set their sights on the airfield, which was duly bombarded but suffered little damage, as much of the guns' ammunition had already been spent.

คนเขารูปช้าง

(ขอแทรกครับ บรรทัดแรกภาษาอังกฤษคือคำบรยายใต้ภาพ ในโพสต์อันที่ผ่านๆมาแล้วครับ)

Japanese landing craft in Songkhla


At the airfield, undeterred by the waning Thai artillery bombardment, Ki 27s of the 1st, 11th, and 77th Sentais "began winging their way in from their Southern Indochina bases, via Phu Quoc; several came to grief when touching down on the rain-sodden grass airfield." Japanese H6K seaplanes of the Toko Kokutai also arrived, parking in Songkhla Lake, Thailand 's largest natural lake.

Sporadic firing from the Thai units continued, while the Japanese managed with little difficulty to repulse an ad hoc 50-man platoon of artillerymen under 2nd Lieutenant Lhi Kongkai.

In the meanwhile, Captain Dejd and his band of signallers watched a trainload of enemy troops rushed past Mount Rup Chaang. A Japanese call for surrender had been repudiated, but other than that the fighting was not intense - Colonel Luang Praharnkhasukh was fully aware of the bleak predicament he and his men were in and was therefore disinclined to aggressively engage the enemy; the Japanese on the other hand were too busy unloading equipment and me.

Orders to cease firing were received by the 41st Battalion's signals platoon at 11:55, and a delegation was hastily arranged to go negotiate with the Japanese. Consisting of 1st Lieutenants Uem Yuyuen and Bunchoo Phokhwath, and a bureaucrat from the Ministry of Defence, Uen Manthalampha, the delegation made its way to the Samrong Canal bridge, where a Japanese officer told them that the 25th Army has already been informed of the situation and that no negotiations need take place. He subsequently handed a letter from General Yamashita to be given to Colonel Luang Praharnkhasukh, and the party returned to the Thai positions.

Engagement at Hat Yai

At 01:15 on December 8, 1941, Lieutenant Colonel Khun Thaelthekingpoln, commanding officer of the 5th Infantry Battalion stationed at in Hat Yai, was informed of the presence of hostile ships parked outside of Songkhla. He expeditiously responded to the news by ordering a bugler to sound the call to arms. Thirty-five minutes later the Lieutenant Colonel received another telephone call, this time informing him that the Japanese have landed. The line went dead halfway through the message.

The 5th Infantry Battalion thus speedily prepared to move up the Saiburi-Songkhla road. A detachment composed of 1st Company, one machinegun platoon, and one field gun platoon, personally commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Khun Thaelthekingpoln, would move up to assist the 13th Artillery and 41st Infantry Battalions in repulsing the enemy around Songkhla, in accordance with the plan outlined by Major General Luang Senanarong on December 6.

คนเขารูปช้าง

(ขอแทรกครับ บรรทัดแรกภาษาอังกฤษคือคำบรยายใต้ภาพ ในโพสต์อันที่ผ่านๆมาแล้วครับ)

Japanese troops disembark from a transport ship. 


A second detachment, composed of the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Companies, would follow in trucks to as far as Nam Noi commune, where they would set up a defensive position.

The forward detachment slowed to a halt at the road-railway intersection at Khuan Mae Taeo as it sighted and opened fire on the invaders. When the Japanese patrols were driven off, men of the 2nd Company had the road construction vehicles parked at the Nam Noi station form a roadblock on the road-rail intersection.

2nd Lieutenant Pranot Vecharaks, commanding the battalion's signals platoon, was sent along with a despatch rider to report to Colonel Luang Praharnkhasukh. They made it as far as to Ban Samrong before their motorcycle crashed under enemy small arms fire.

The first clash occurred at 02:40 as the Japanese tried to rush down the road. The ensuing fire fight proved ferocious, but the Thais managed to keep the enemy at bay until approximately 04:00, when 1st Company's commanding officer, Captain Prasitthisin Samphanthayuth reported that his men would not be able to hold the line for any much longer. The forward detachment was thus authorised to pull back to join the defensive line around Tambon Nam Noi.

คนเขารูปช้าง

(ขอแทรกครับ บรรทัดแรกภาษาอังกฤษคือคำบรยายใต้ภาพ ในโพสต์อันที่ผ่านๆมาแล้วครับ)

A view of Hat Yai, circa 1933.


At 08:00 a train bearing Japanese troops heading down from Songkhla was forced to halt upon encountering the roadblock, and was fired upon by the Thais. The Japanese leapt down from the railcars and formed positions around the tracks.

The fighting gradually subsided, and by 14:00 the Thais had ceased fire when Field Marshal P.'s orders reached through. Lieutenant Colonel Khun Thaelthekingpoln and all four of the battalion's company commanders met the Japanese delegation at the intersection. Interpreting in English for the two parties was 2nd Lieutenant Ampho Junlaphrahm and the commander of the 143rd Regiment.

The Japanese reprimanded the Thais for fighting them, which had caused not only casualties for both sides, but also delayed thier invasion of Malaya. It was then agreed that the Thais were to return to and remain in Camp Khorhong for the time being, lest any further bloodshed may occur as a result of additional misunderstandings.

Formal negotiations were later held in the Hat Yai train station at 18:00. Among the Thai delegation were Colonel Luang Chaansongkhram, the government's main representative, Lieutenant Colonel Khun Thaelthekingpoln, Prince Worawan, representing the Royal Siamese Railway (RSR), and the interpreter, 2nd Lieutenant Ampho Junlaphrahm.

The results of the negotiations can be summed up as the following points:

1. Thai railway personnel were to return to their posts and to assist the Japanese in the movement of their troops to and across the Thai-Malayan border; in this process trains belonging to the RSR are to be used.

2. The Thais would assist the Japanese in repairing the bridge on the Ngae Canal, which had been blown up by an armoured train manned by a detachment of 2/16 Punjab, and the road leading up to the border.

3. Thai civilians were to be urged not to resist the Japanese or to sabotage their activities. The Japanese were to maintain order among their ranks and see to it that no damage is done to Thai property.

Japanese requests for the apprehension of enemy nationals, i.e. British and Americans, were turned down by the Thais; while the question of buying food, goods, and services with Japanese currency was to be taken up with the government.

Casualties

A total of fifteen men of the 41st Infantry Battalion were killed during the engagement, nine of whom were noncommissioned officers and six of whom were privates.

The 5th Infantry Battalion suffered at total of eight men killed, consisting of one officer and seven ORs.


Sources
Bloody Shambles Christopher Shores , Brian Cull, & Yasuho Izawa 
Burma 1942: The Japanese Invasion Ian Lyall Grant & Kazuo Tamayama 
Far Eastern File: The Intelligence War in the Far East 1930-1945 Peter Elphick
Operation Matador Ong Chit Chung 
The Royal Thai Armed Forces' Official History of the Greater East Asian War
Singapore: The Japanese Version Masanobu Tsuji 
Singapore: The Pregnable Fortress Peter Elphick 
Songkhram Mued: Yippun Buk Thai (Japan Invades Thailand) Sorasanya Phaengspha
Tales from the Inner Palace Major General Dejd Tulawanthana 

http://www.geocities.com/thailandwwii/songkhla.html

© 2004-2006 P.Klykoom

sirichot

เคยอ่านเจอในหนังสือว่า ทหารได้วางแนวต้านญี่ปุ่นอยู่ที่สถานีรถไฟน้ำน้อย โดยมีแผนว่าหากต้าไม่ไหวจะถอยกำลังไปทางหาดใหญ่ และระเบิดสะพานน้ำน้อยทิ้ง เพื่อชะลอกองทัพญี่ปุ่น แต่ทางรัฐบาลได้ประกาศยินยอมเป็นพันธมิตรกับกองทัพญี่ปุ่นเสียก่อน ทหารจึงต้องยินยอมให้กองทัพญี่ปุ่นเดินทางผ่านน้ำน้อย
ทราบจากคนเก่าที่น้ำน้อยว่ากองทัพญี่ปุ่นมาตั้งค่ายอยู่ที่หน้า CP บ้านโคกสูงในปัจจุบัน ส่วนที่เขาบันไดนางข้างอุตสาหกรรม จะมีคล้ายๆวิหารที่สร้างไม่เสร็จอยู่ ร่ำลือกันว่าภายในมีสมบัติทหารญี่ปุ่นอยู่

ohpiya00

เห็นจากวิดีโอทหารญี่ปุ่นใช้จักรยานเป็นพาหนะ เลยเชื่อเลยครับ ที่คนแต่แรกเขาเล่าว่าญี่ปุ่นจะยึดจักรยานชาวบ้านมาใช้ เพื่อเคลื่อนที่เร็วครับ แล้วไม่ต้องหาน้ำมันมาเติมรถให้ยุ่งยากด้วย ปัญญาจริง

เอกะ ซาโน่

ในฐานะเป็นลูกของทหารผ่านศึกในช่วงนั้น พ่อก็เคยเล่าให้ฟังเรื่องการยิงกับทหารญี่ปุ่นที่สถานีรถไฟน้ำน้อย แต่ตอนนี้พ่อไม่อยู่แล้วผมได้รับเกียรติเป็นทหารผ่านศึกเหรียญชัยสมรภูมิเสียเอง(เพราะได้รับมรดกตามระเบียบของทหารผ่านศึก) ขอบคุณภาพและเรื่องราวดีๆ ที่หายาก เป็นประวัติศาสตร์ของบ้านเรา ที่น่าจะมีอนุสรณ์สถานประวัติศาสตร์ของบ้านเราบ้าง ตอนนี้ตัวสถานีรถไฟน้ำน้อยก็ไม่มีแล้ว เป็นของนายทุนไปหมดแล้ว

vudhichai.phetsuwan

หนึ่งในทหารหาญของค่ายคอหงส์ที่ยิงปะทะกับทหารญี่ปุ่นที่สมรภูมิรบช่องเขาบันไดนาง น้ำน้อย ซึ่งผมเคยสัมภาษณ์ท่านไว้เมื่อ ปี ๒๕๕๕ คือ พลฯประมวล สวัสดี ชาวบ้านพรุ เพิ่งเสียชีวิตไปเมื่อ ปี ๒๕๕๗ นี่เองครับ

คนแถวนี้

พลฯประมวล ท่านว่ายังไงบ้างครับ ^^

มารุต

ขอบคุณสำหรับรูปภาพดีๆครับ

animejoust


boxing


fitnessbody

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